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Abstract.   Although evidence accrues in biology, anthropology and experimental 
economics that homo sapiens is a cooperative species, the reigning assumption in 
economic theory is that individuals optimize in an autarkic manner (as in Nash and 
Walrasian equilibrium).  I here postulate an interdependent kind of optimizing behavior, 
called Kantian.  It is shown that in simple economic models, when there are negative 
externalities (such as congestion effects from use of a commonly owned resource) or 
positive externalities (such as a social ethos reflected in individuals’ preferences), 
Kantian equilibria dominate Nash-Walras equilibria in terms of efficiency.  While 
economists schooled in Nash equilibrium may view the Kantian behavior as utopian, 
there is some – perhaps much -- evidence that it exists.  If cultures evolve through group 
selection, the hypothesis that Kantian behavior is more prevalent than we may think is 
supported by the efficiency results here demonstrated. 
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1. Introduction 
 Three strands of work in contemporary social science, evolutionary biology, and 
political philosophy unite in emphasizing this fact: that homo sapiens is a cooperative 
species.  In evolutionary biology, this statement is accepted as a premise, and scientists 
are interested in explaining how cooperation and ‘altruism’ may have developed among 
humans.   In economics, there is now a long series of experiments whose results are most 
easily explained by the hypothesis that individuals are to some degree altruistic.    
Altruism is to be distinguished from reciprocity: when behaving in a cooperative manner, 
a reciprocator expects cooperation in return, which will increase his/her net payoff  (net, 
that is, of the original sacrifice entailed in cooperation), while an altruist cooperates 
without the expectation of a future reciprocating behavior.   Many biologists, 
experimental economists, and anthropologists now accept the existence of altruistic as 
well as reciprocating behavior.    A recent summary of the state-of-the-art in experimental 
economics, anthropology, and evolutionary biology is provided by Bowles and Gintis 
(2011).   See Rabin (2006) for a summary of the evidence from experimental economics.   
An anthropological view is provided in Henrich and Henrich (2007).  A recent paper 
which provides a good bibliography of work attempting to explain altruistic preferences 
as evolutionary equilibria is Alger and Weibull (2012). 
 In political philosophy, G.A. Cohen (2010) offers a definition of ‘socialism’ as a 
society in which earnings of individuals at first accord with a conception of equality of 
opportunity that has developed in the last thirty years in political philosophy (see Rawls 
(1971), Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989), and Cohen(1989)), but in which inequality in 
those earnings is then reduced because of the necessity to maintain ‘community,’ an ethos 
in which ‘…people care about, and where necessary, care for one another, and, too, care 
that they care about one another.’   Community, Cohen argues, may induce a society to 
reduce material inequalities (for example, through taxation) that would otherwise be 
acceptable according to ‘socialist’ equality of opportunity.   But, Cohen writes: 
…the principal problem that faces the socialist ideal is that we do 
not know how to design the machinery that would make it run. Our problem is 
not, primarily, human selfishness, but our lack of a suitable organizational 
technology: our problem is a problem of design. It may be an insoluble design 
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problem, and it is a design problem that is undoubtedly exacerbated by our selfish 
propensities, but a design problem, so I think, is what we’ve got.  
 
 An economist reading these words thinks of the first theorem of welfare 
economics.   A Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto efficient in an economy with complete 
markets, private goods, and the absence of externalities.  But under the communitarian 
ethos, people care about the welfare of others – which induces massive consumption 
externalities – and so the competitive equilibrium will not, in general, be efficient.  What 
economic mechanism can deliver efficiency under these conditions2? 
 There is an important line of research, conducted by Ostrom (1990) and her 
collaborators, arguing that, in many small societies, people figure out how to avoid, or 
solve, the ‘tragedy of the commons.’  The ‘tragedy’ has in common with altruism the 
existence of an externality which conventional optimizing behavior does not properly 
address3.   It may be summarized as follows.  Imagine a lake which is owned in common 
by a group of fishers, who each possess preferences over fish and leisure, and perhaps 
differential skill (or sizes of boats) in (or for) fishing.  The lake produces fish with 
decreasing returns with respect to the fishing labor expended upon it.  In the game in 
which each fisher proposes as her strategy a fishing time, the Nash equilibrium is 
inefficient: there are congestion externalities, and all would be better off were they able 
to design a decrease, of a certain kind, in everyone’s fishing.    Ostrom has studied many 
such societies, and maintains that many or most of them learn to regulate ‘fishing,’ 
without privatizing the ‘lake.’   Somehow, the inefficient Nash equilibrium is avoided.   
This example is not one in which fishers care about other fishers (necessarily), but it is 
one in which cooperation is organized to deal with a negative externality of autarkic 
behavior. 
  Ostrom’s observations pertain to small societies.   In large economies, we 
observe the evolution of the welfare state, supported by considerable degrees of taxation 
                                                
2 In war-time Britain, many spoke of ‘doing their bit’ for the war effort – voluntary 
additional sacrifice for the sake of the common good.  (See the wonderful BBC series 
‘Foyle’s War’ to understand the pervasiveness of this ethos.)   But, if I want to contribute 
to the common struggle, how much extra should I do?   
3 In the case of altruism, ‘conventional’ behavior is market behavior, and in the case of 
the tragedy of the commons, it is autarkic optimizing behavior in using a resource which 
is owned in common. 
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of market earnings.   It is not immediately evident that welfare states are due to a feeling 
of community (à la Cohen), or simply provide a more conventional public good or a good 
in which market failures abound (insurance), or reflect reciprocating behavior  among 
citizens (welfare states expand after wars, perhaps as a reward to returning soldiers; see 
Scheve and Stasavage[in press]).    Nevertheless, the large scope of welfare states, 
especially in Northern Europe, is perhaps most easily explained by a communitarian 
ethos.  Redistributive taxation is, that is to say,  at least some degree a reaction to the   
material deprivation of a section of society, which others view as undeserved, and desire 
to redress.   Nevertheless, as is well-known, redistributive taxation induces, to some 
degree, allocative inefficiency.  The solution is second-best. 
 Economic theorists are beginning to pay attention to the design problem – that is, 
how to achieve economic efficiency in a society where people care about other people.   
Perhaps to say they are ‘beginning’ to do so is uncharitable: implementation theory, 
largely initiated with Maskin’s (1999) work of thirty years ago, asks whether a social-
choice rule can be implemented as the Nash equilibrium of a game.   And before Maskin, 
Leonid Hurwicz pioneered the work on mechanism design, in which he studied the 
efficiency properties of different economic mechanisms at a highly abstract level.  This 
work, however, did not focus upon the issue of externalities induced by the fact that 
people care about the welfare of other people. 
 A recent contribution which is relevant to this inquiry is that of  Dufwenberg, 
Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, and Sobel (2010),  entitled “Other-regarding preferences 
in general equilibrium,” which studies, at an abstract level,  the veracity of the first and 
second welfare theorems in the presence of other-regarding preferences. From the 
viewpoint of the evolution of economic thought, it is significant that their article is the 
result of combining three independent papers by subsets of the five authors: in other 
words, the problem of addressing seriously the efficiency consequences of the existence 
of other-regarding preferences is certainly in the air at present. 
 In this paper, I wish to offer a partial solution to two problems of economic 
allocation: how to achieve efficiency in environments where there are positive and 
negative externalities and individuals are conventionally self-interested,  and secondly, 
how to achieve efficiency in the presence of a social ethos – I use the term, taken from 
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Bowles and Gintis (2011) -- although ‘other-regarding preferences’ is a synonym.   
(Perhaps social ethos includes the kind of second-order preference that G.A. Cohen refers 
to in defining community, that people care that they care about others,  while ‘other-
regarding preferences’ does not.)  The ‘problem’ is that market equilibria are in general 
Pareto inefficient in the presence of a social ethos, and moreover, redistributive taxation 
is also inefficient.  
 I next describe the economic environment for this inquiry. There is a concave 
production function which produces a single output from a single input, called effort.  
Effort is supplied by individuals; it may differ in intensity or efficiency units, but effort 
can be aggregated across individuals when measured in the proper units.  Individuals 
have conventional personal utility functions, representing their self-interested preferences 
over income and effort.   In general, they care about the welfare of others as well.  There 
are two aspects to this caring:  how individuals choose to aggregate individual welfares 
into social welfare, and the degree to which social welfare counts in the individual’s 
preferences.  We will assume here that individuals are homogeneous with respect to these 
two decisions.   
  An individual of type  has preferences represented by an all-encompassing 
utility function which might be of the form: 
 
 
U γ (x(⋅), E(⋅)) = uγ (x(γ ), E(γ ))+αexp log[uτ(x(τ), E(τ))∫ ]dF(τ)    (1.1) 
where  u
γ (⋅,⋅) is the personal utility function of type γ over consumption and effort, 
 E(⋅) : + → +  is a function which describes the efforts of individuals of all types,  
 x(⋅) : + → +  is a function which defines the amount of output (a single good) allocated 
to each type, α  is a non-negative number measuring the degree of social ethos, F is the 
distribution of types in the society, and the social-welfare function  (in this case) is given 
by a member of the CES family  
    
 
W p (u[i]) = u[i]p dF(i)∫( )1/ p ,     (1.2) 
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as  p 0 .  (It is well-known that the function in (1.2) approaches the exponential of the 
average of the logarithms as  p 0 .)   Think of an individual’s type as signifying, inter 
alia, the degree to which effort is easy for him, or his natural talent. 
 A society in which people do not count the welfare of others is one with 
individualistic ethos: in such a society,  α = 0 ,  A society in which they do is one with 
social ethos.  Social ethos can be stronger or weaker, as represented by the  
parameter α .  When α = ∞ , the economy is equivalent to the one in which for everyone, 
all-encompassing utility is equal to social welfare; this is the purely altruistic economy. 
 Production is described by a differentiable, concave production function G.  In the 
continuum economy, the value  G(E)  is per capita output of the good when the effort 
schedule is  E( )  and  E ≡ E(γ )dF(γ )∫ .   When the number of agents is finite, I usually 
write the discrete effort vector as  E = (E
1,..., En ) and the sum of efforts as  E
S ≡ E j∑ .   
Total output is then  G(E
S ) . 
 Suppose that G is linear and there is a private-ownership economy with zero 
profits at competitive equilibrium.  A typical allocation rule is the linear-tax rule: 
   xt
γ (E(⋅)) = (1− t)wE(γ )+ t wE(τ)dF(τ)∫  ,    (1.3) 
where w is the wage paid by the firm and t is the tax rate.   Under the competitive 
assumption, the firm pays a wage equal to the marginal product of effort,  w = ′G (E) .  
There are two important kinds of externality here – both positive: the tax system creates 
positive externalities to individual labor, because in general some of each worker’s 
earnings is redistributed to others, and there are also positive consumption externalities 
due to social ethos.   It is unfortunate that, under classical behavior, at least if the 
economy is large, individuals ignore the positive externalities induced by their labor.  I 
call this classical behavior autarkic, and contrast it with behavior that I call 
interdependent.    The equilibrium concept associated with autarkic behavior is Nash 
equilibrium; the concept associated with interdependent behavior is Kantian equilibrium.    
In Nash equilibrium, each person adjusts his action if and only if his situation would 
improve assuming that others do not adjust theirs.  In Kantian equilibrium, a person 
adjusts his action if and only if his situation would improve if all others adjust their 
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actions in similar fashion to the personal adjustment he is contemplating.  Definitions 
will be provided in the next section.  There is only one concept of Nash equilibrium, but 
there are many concepts of Kantian equilibrium, because the phrase ‘in similar fashion’ 
can be spelled out in various ways.  
 My main focus will be upon behavior: that is, upon how a change in optimizing 
behavior from autarkic to interdependent  (Nash to Kantian) can (or cannot) resolve the 
inefficiencies due to positive and negative externalities, and in particular, those induced 
by the existence of a social ethos.     Just as economists are often asked to accept the idea 
that the formal concept Nash equilibrium captures a common kind of actual stable point 
in human economic relations, so I will ask readers to accept, for the sake of argument, 
that Kantian equilibrium (in its various versions) can capture a kind of social equilibrium.   
In section 5,  I will contemplate whether Kantian behavior is achievable in human 
societies, or is simply a utopian idea. 
 I contrast the approach here with that of almost all the literature on altruism,  cited 
earlier.   In that literature, the focus is upon explaining the emergence and stability of 
altruistic preferences.   My focus here is upon a different protocols of optimization, and 
hence upon different conceptions of equilibrium in games4. 
 Section 2 defines Kantian equilibrium, and studies its efficiency properties in 
conventional economies where there is individualistic ethos.  Section 3 looks at 
economies with a social ethos, and studies Kantian equilibrium there.  Section 4 provides 
an existence theorem for Kantian equilibrium, and comments upon dynamic properties. 
Section 5 discusses the question whether Kantian optimization is a utopian idea, of only 
theoretical interest, or whether it might come to be characterize human societies.   
 I originally proposed the definition of (multiplicative) Kantian equilibrium in 
Roemer (1996), and showed its relationship to the ‘proportional solution.’  In Roemer 
(2010), I investigated multiplicative Kantian equilibrium more carefully.  The present 
paper shows that there are many versions of Kantian optimization, and characterizes 
                                                
4 One can define a two-by-two taxonomy of models.  Preferences can be either altruistic 
or individualistic, and optimization can either be Nash or Kantian.  The classical world is 
modeled as (individualistic preferences, Nash optimization).   The work I have cited 
focuses upon models of the form (altruistic, Nash).  In this paper, I study (individualistic, 
Kantian) and (altruistic, Kantian).   
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when they deliver efficient outcomes in the presence of the various kinds of externality 
that I have reviewed in this section. 
 
2.  Kantian equilibrium in economies with an individualistic ethos 
 
 Immanuel Kant proposed the behavioral ethic known as the categorical 
imperative: take those actions and only those actions which you would have all others 
emulate5.    This suggests the following formalization.  Let  {V (E( ))} be a set of payoff 
functions for a game played by types γ, where the strategy of each player is a non-
negative effort  E( ) .  Thus the payoff of each depends upon the efforts of all.  A 
multiplicative Kantian equilibrium is an effort schedule  E
*( )  such that nobody would 
prefer that everybody alter his effort by the same factor. That is: 
  (∀γ )(∀r ≥ 0)(V
γ (E*(⋅)) ≥V γ (rE*(⋅))) . (2.1) 
   
In Roemer (1996, 2010), this concept was simply called ‘Kantian equilibrium.’  
 The remarkable feature of multiplicative Kantian equilibrium is that it resolves 
the tragedy of the commons.  Consider the example given in section 1 of the community 
of fishers.    At an effort allocation  E( ) , if each fisher of type γ keeps his catch, then his 
fish income will be : 
 
 
x f (E(⋅),γ ) = E(γ )
E
G(E) . (2.2)  . 
Thus, the fishers’ game is defined by the payoff functions: 
  V
γ (E(⋅)) = uγ (x f (E(⋅),γ ), E(γ )) . (2.3) 
 It is proved in the two citations given above to Kantian equilibrium  that if a 
strictly positive effort allocation is a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium, then it is Pareto 
efficient in the economy  ξ = (u,G, F ,0) , where u is a profile of concave utility functions, 
and the last co-ordinate in the description of the economy is the value of α .   This is a 
                                                
5 The somewhat more general version of the categorical imperative is that one’s behavior 
should accord with 'universalizable maxims.’ 
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stronger statement than saying the allocation is efficient in the game  {V } : for in the 
game, only certain types of allocation are permitted – ones in which fish are distributed in 
proportion to effort expended.  But the economy (u,G, F ,0)  defines any allocation as 
feasible, as long as  x(γ )dF(γ )∫ ≤ G(E) .   So Kantian behavior, if adopted by 
individuals, resolves the tragedy of the commons.     The intuition is that the Kantian 
counterfactual (that every person will expand his labor by a factor r if I do so – or so I 
contemplate) forces each to internalize the externality associated with the congestion 
effect of his own fishing.    It is not obvious that multiplicative Kantian equilibrium will 
internalize the externality in exactly the right way – to produce efficiency – but it does.  
 A proportional solution in the fisher economy is defined as an allocation 
 (x( ), E( ))  with two properties: 
 (i)  x( ) = x
f (E( ), ) , and 
 (ii)  (x( ), E( ))  is Pareto efficient. 
The proportional solution was introduced in Roemer and Silvestre (1993), although the 
concept of (multiplicative) Kantian equilibrium came later.  The proportional solutions of 
the fisher economy are exactly its positive multiplicative Kantian equilibria  (see theorem 
1 below).  In the small societies which Ostrom has studied, which are (in the formal 
sense) usually ‘economies of fishers’ where each ‘keeps his catch,’ she argues that 
internal regulation assigns ‘fishing times’ that engender a Pareto efficient allocation.  If 
this is so, these allocations are proportional solutions, and therefore (by the theorem just 
quoted) they are multiplicative Kantian equilibria in the game where participating 
fishers/hunters/miners propose labor times for accessing a commonly owned resource.    
This suggests that small societies discover their multiplicative Kantian equilibria.  
Ostrom (1990), however, does not provide any evidence for Kantian thinking among 
citizens of these socieities.   Knowing the theory of multiplicative Kantian equilibrium, 
one is tempted to ask whether a ‘Kantian ethos’ exists in these small societies, which 
somehow leads to the discovery of the equilibrium. 
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 I now introduce a second Kantian protocol which leads to additive Kantian 
equilibrium6. An effort allocation  E( )  is an additive Kantian equilibrium if and only if 
no individual would have all individuals add (or subtract) the same amount of effort to 
everyone’s present effort.  That is: 
 
 
(∀γ )(∀r ≥ − inf
τ
E(τ))(V γ (E(⋅)) ≥V γ (E(⋅)+ r)) , (2.4) 
where  E( )+ r  is the allocation in which the effort of type γ individuals is  E(γ )+ r .  The 
lower bound 
 
(r ≥ − inf
τ
E(τ))  is necessary to avoid negative efforts, and to keep the 
optimization problem proposed in (2.4) a concave problem.    (It is assumed that effort is 
unbounded above but bounded below by zero.)   Additive Kantian equilibrium again 
postulates that each person ‘internalizes’ the effects of his contemplated change in effort, 
but now the variation is additive rather than multiplicative. 
 In the sequel, I will denote these two kinds of Kantian behavior as  K  and  K + . 
 We can moreover define a general ‘Kantian variation’ which includes as special 







a Kantian variation if : 
    x (x,1) = x , 
and if,  for any  x ≠ 0  , the function   ϕ(x,⋅)  maps onto the non-negative real line. 
Denote by  [E( ),r]  the effort schedule  E  defined by  E( ) = (E( ),r) .   
Then an effort schedule  E( )  is a Kantian equilibrium if and only if: 
  (∀γ )(V
γ (ϕ[E(⋅),r]) is maximized at r = 1) . (2.5)  
If we let  (x,r) = rx , this definition reduces to multiplicative Kantian equilibrium; if we 
let  (x,r) = x + r 1, it reduces to additive Kantian equilibrium.   
 Let  (x,r)  be any Kantian variation that is concave in r, and let the payoff 
functions with respect to some sharing rule  {V
γ}  be concave.   Then a positive effort 
schedule  E( )  is a positive Kantian equilibrium if and only if: 
                                                







V γ (ϕ[E(⋅),r]) = 0 . (2.6)   
Eqn. (2.6) follows immediately from definition (2.5), since  V ( [E( ),r])  is a concave 
function of r, and hence its maximum, if it is interior, is achieved where its derivative 
with respect to r is zero.    Note that both the additive and multiplicative Kantian 
variations are concave functions of r. 
 I find it convenient to describe allocation rules by sharing rules.   Denote by G 
the set of all concave differentiable production functions, and by E the set of all effort 
vectors, that is, functions  E : + → + .   A sharing rule is a set of functions  {θ
γ}, one 
for each type, where  θ
γ :E×G→ [0,1]  and for all  (E,G) : 
  θ
γ (E,G)dF(γ ) = 1∫ . (2.7) 
The amount of output which type γ  receives at  E(⋅) when the production function is G is 
 θ
γ (E,G)G(E) , where  E  is interpreted as average effort in continuum economies, and as 
the sum of efforts in finite economies.   Note that, although sharing rules (and hence 
allocation rules) can depend on G, they do not depend on the utility functions of agents. 
 
Examples. 
1.  The proportional sharing rule is given by 
 
θγ ,P(E(⋅),G) = E(γ )
E
 
2.  The equal division sharing rule is given by  
 
 
θγ ,ED (E(⋅),G) =
1,  in continuum economies
1
n







3.  The Walrasian sharing rules are given by: 
 
 
θγ ,W (E(⋅),G) = ′G (E)E(γ )
G(E)







where  σ(γ )  is the share of the firm that operates G owned by each agent of type γ .    
Note that although the proportional and equal-division sharing rules do not, in fact, 
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depend upon G, the Walrasian sharing does (except when G is linear).   This is one 
reason it is important to allow sharing rules to depend on G. 
 Once we propose a sharing rule, then we can define, for any economy  (u,G, F ,0) , 
its payoff functions  {V
γ} , and hence its  K
×  and K +  equilibria.  Define the domain of 
concave economies  G  as all economies  (u,G, F ,α)  where u is a profile of concave 
personal utility functions  u : +
2 → , G ∈G , F is a distribution function of types, and 
 α ≥ 0  is any degree of social ethos.   (We fix the social-welfare function – for instance, 
the one displayed in (1.1).)   Denote by  G0  the class of economies with  α = 0 , by  G
fin  
the class of economies with a finite number of agents, and by  L  the class of economies 
where G is linear, and so.   (E.g.,  L0, fin  is the class of finite economies with  α = 0 .) 
Although proofs of theorems will generally appear in the appendix, it is important to 
demonstrate the most important idea in this paper by proving the first proposition in the 
text.   
 
Proposition 1   Any strictly positive  K ×  equilibrium with respect to the proportional 
sharing rule is Pareto efficient on the domain  G0 .   Any strictly positive  K +  equilibrium 
with respect to the equal-division sharing rule is Pareto efficient on the domain  G0 . 
Proof: 
1.  Let  E(⋅)  be a strictly positive  K
×  equilibrium w.r.t. the proportional sharing rule  θ
P .   





















γ E(γ ) = 0 . (2.9) 







γ = ′G (E) . (2.10) 
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Eqn. (2.10) states that the marginal rate of substitution between income and effort is, for 
every agent, equal to the marginal rate of transformation, which is exactly the condition 
for Pareto efficiency at an interior solution.  This proves the first claim. 
2.  For the second claim, let  E(⋅)  be a  K
+  equilibrium w.r.t. the equal-division sharing 
rule  θ






u(G(E + r), E(γ )+ r) = 0 , (2.11) 
which means: 
  (∀γ ) u1
γ ⋅ ′G (E)+ u2
γ = 0 . (2.12) 
(Strict positivity of E is here used so that the range of r includes a small neighborhood of 
zero.)   Clearly (2.12) implies (2.10), and again the allocation is Pareto efficient.  
 Examine the proof of the first part of this proposition, and compare the reasoning 
that agents who are Kantian employ to Nash reasoning.  When a fisher contemplates 
increasing his effort on the lake by 10%,  she asks herself, “How would I like it if 
everyone increased his effort by 10%?”  She is thereby forced to internalize the 
externality that her increased labor would impose on others, when G is strictly concave.   
 It is important to note that, in Kantian optimization, agents evaluate deviations 
from their own viewpoints, as in Nash optimization.   They do not put themselves in the 
shoes of others, as they do in Rawls’s original position, or in Harsanyi’s (1977) thought 
experiment in which agents employ empathy.   In this sense,  Kantian behavior requires 
less of a displacement of the self than ‘veil-of-ignorance’ thought experiments require.    
Agents require no empathy to conduct Kantian optimization: what changes from Nash 
behavior is the supposition about the counterfactual.    
 Indeed, the next theorem states that there is a unidimensional continuum of 
sharing rules, with the proportional and equal-division rules as its two endpoints, each of 
which can be efficiently implemented on  G0  using a particular Kantian variation.  Define 




γ (E(⋅)) = E(γ )+β
E +β
, 0 ≤ β ≤ ∞  (2.13) 
and the Kantian variations: 
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ϕβ(x,r) = rx + (r −1)β, 0 ≤ β ≤ ∞ . (2.14) 
( For finite economies, we write (2.13) as 
 
θβ
γ (E(⋅)) = E(γ )+β
ES + nβ
, ES = E(τ)∑ .)   Note 
that for  β = 0 , θβ  is the proportional rule and ϕβ  is the multiplicative Kantian variation, 
and for β = ∞ , θβ  is the equal-division rule and ϕβ  is the additive Kantian variation (this 
last fact is perhaps not quite obvious).    We will call a Kantian equilibrium associated 
with the variation ϕβ ,  a  K
β  equilibrium.    (So  K 0 ≡ K × , etc.) 
 Before stating the next theorem we must define the following.  Fix β  and an 
effort vector  E ∈ ++






.   Now consider the set of vectors in  +






n ))  where x varies over the positive real numbers, 
but restricted to an interval that keeps the defined vector non-negative.  This is a 
unidimensional manifold in  +
n  which I denote as  M E
j .      We have: 
 
 
Theorem 17   For  0 ≤ β ≤ ∞ : 
A. If  E(⋅)  is a strictly positive  K
β  equilibrium w.r.t. the sharing rule θβ  at any economy 
in  G0 , then the induced allocation is Pareto efficient.   
B.   θ0  is the only sharing rule for which the  K
×  equilibrium is Pareto efficient on the 
domain  G0, fin .  
C. For  β > 0 ,  the only sharing rules that are efficiently implementable on  G
0, fin
 are of 
the form 
 
θ j (E,G) = θβ
j (E)+ k
j (E)
G(E)  where  




k j (E) ≡ 0
j
∑  
                                                
7  Theorem 3 of Roemer (2010) stated something similar to part B of the present theorem, 
but the proof offered there is incorrect.     
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 (ii)  (∀j, E)(θ
j (E,G)∈[0,1]) , and  
 (iii)  (∀j, E)(k
j  is constant on the manifold M E
j ) . That is, on  M E
j ,  
    ∇k
j ⋅r j ≡ 0 .  
Proof: See appendix8. 
 The theorem states first that for all  β ≥ 0 , the pair  
(ϕβ ,θβ )  is an efficient Kantian 
pair: i.e., that the sharing rule θβ  is efficiently implementable in  K
β  equilibrium on the 
convex domain  E
0, fin .   Part C states that the only other sharing rules that are K β  
implementable are ones which add numbers to the θβ  shares that are constant on certain 
sets of lines in  +
n .   Part B states that (in the unique case when  β = 0 ) these constants 
must be zero.   
 Unfortunately, part C makes theorem 1 difficult to state.  One may ask, is it 
necessary?   That is, do there in fact exist sharing rules satisfying conditions C (i)-C(iii) 
of the theorem where the functions  k j  are not identically zero?   The following example 
shows that there are. 
 
Example 4. 
 We consider  K +  equilibrium (i.e., β = ∞ ) where  n = 2 .  In this case  
   
 
θ∞
j (E1, E2 ) = 1
2
 , 








1 − E2 )
2G(E1 + E2 )




1 − E2 )
2G(E1 + E2 )








θ2(E) = 1− θ1(E)
     .  (2.15) 
                                                
8 I believe that parts B and C are also true on the space of continuum economies, but 
proving that would require more sophisticated mathematical techniques. 
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The  θ  rule satisfies conditions C(i)-C(iii).     To explain in words why rules like this 
work, think of what happens when we apply the appropriate Kantian variation to a vector 
E under this rule.   In this case, we add a constant r to all effort levels.  Notice that the 
second term in  θ
j (E)  is unaffected, because  E
1 + r − (E2 + r) = E1 − E2 .   Therefore, 
when looking at Kantian deviations, and setting the derivative of utility equal to zero at 
 r = 0  (in the additive case),  these  k j  terms vanish.  Sharing rules like  θ  can be 
constructed for any n  and any  β > 0 . 
 From the history-of-thought vantage point, the case  β = 0  is the classical socialist 
economy: that is, it’s an economy where output is distributed in proportion to labor 
expended and efficiently so.   The rule θβ  in case β = ∞  is the classical ‘communist’  
economy: output is distributed ‘according to need’ (here, needs are identical across 
persons), and efficiently so.   Obviously, the sharing rules θβ associated with  β ∈(0,∞)  
are (in a sense) averages between these two classical concepts.   If the ‘interactive’ 
optimization reflected in the Kantian way of thinking is akin to a kind of cooperation, it is 
perhaps not surprising to note that these classical concepts of cooperative societies are 
efficiently implemented by different versions of Kantianism.   
 I believe that history displays examples of both the proportional and equal-
division solutions.   The former has been discussed in relation to Ostrom’s work on fisher 
economies.  And anthropologists conjecture that many hunter-gatherer societies 
employed equal-division.  Many Israeli kibbutzim employed the equal division rule, at 
least in the early days.  (Whether they found Pareto efficient equal-division allocations is 
another question.)    Theorem 1 suggests that we look for societies that implemented 
some of the other allocation rules in the β  continuum, although the Kantian variation 
involved for  β ∉{0,∞}may be too arcane for human societies.  
 It remains to ask, when we discover an example of a society which appears to 
implement one of these sharing rules, whether Kantian thinking among its members plays 
a role in maintaining its stability.   Just as a Nash equilibrium is stable, so a Kantian 
allocation will be stable if the players in the game employ Kantian optimization.  
 The analogous result to theorem 1 for Nash equilibrium is: 
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Theorem 2  
A.  There is no sharing rule that is efficiently implementable in Nash equilibrium on the 
domain  E
0, fin .    
B. On continuum economies, Walrasian rules are efficiently Nash implementable9. 
Proof: Appendix.  
 
 The reason that the Walrasian sharing rule, as defined in the previous footnote, is 
not efficiently implementable in Nash equilibrium on finite economies is that an 
individual’s Nash behavior at the Walrasian sharing rule takes account of her affect on 
 ′G (E
S )  and on her share of profits as she deviates her effort  (i.e., agents are not price 
takers).  It is only in the continuum economy that the agent rationally ignores such 
affects, and hence, Nash behavior induces efficiency.    Of course, this is the point that 
Makowski and Ostroy (2001)   have focused upon in their work on the distinction 
between perfect competition and Walrasian equilibrium.   
 
                                                
9 A Walrasian rule allocates output to an individual of type γ  equal to his value marginal 
product   E(γ ) ′G (E)  plus a fixed share of the firm’s profits. 
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3.  Economies with a social ethos 
A. Efficiency results 
 We begin by characterizing interior Pareto efficient allocations in continuum 
economies where individuals have all-encompassing utility functions like those in (1.1), 
except we use the more general CES social-welfare function.  That is, we assume that: 
  









 ,   (3.1) 
where  1 p > .  As noted, the case  p = 0  generates the formulation in (1.1). 
 At an allocation  (x
*( ), E*( )) , we write  u
γ (x*(γ ), E*(γ )) ≡ u[*,γ ] , and for the two 
partial derivatives of u,
 
uj
γ (x*(γ ), E*(γ )) ≡ uj[*,γ ] . 
 
Theorem 3   A strictly positive allocation is Pareto efficient in the economy  (u,G, F ,α)  if 
and only if: 




= G (E) , and 
 





α(Q*)(1− p)/ p u[*,γ ]p−1 u1[*,τ]
−1 dF(τ)∫
1+α(Q*)(1− p)/ p u[*,τ]p−1 dF(τ)∫
, 
where .     
 I offer some remarks about and corollaries to theorem 3. 
 First, we introduce a quasi-linear economy for which the results take a 
particularly simple and intuitive form.   In the quasi-linear economy, we take  
   
 
uγ (x, E) = x − E
2
γ
.         (3.2) 
1.  Note the separate roles played by the conditions (a) and (b) of theorem 3.  Condition 
(a) assures allocative efficiency in the economy with  α = 0 .  Condition (b) is entirely 
responsible for the efficiency requirement induced by social ethos.  Note that the function 
G does not appear in (b).  
  Indeed, it is obvious that any allocation which is Pareto efficient in the α-
economy (for any α) must be efficient in the economy with  α = 0 .  For suppose not.  
 
Q* u[*, ]p dF( )
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Then the allocation in question is Pareto-dominated by some allocation in the 0-economy.  
But immediately, that allocation must dominate the original one in the α -economy, as it 
causes the social-welfare function to increase (as well as the private part u of all-
encompassing utility).  It is therefore not surprising that the characterization of theorem 2 
says that ‘the allocation is efficient in the 0-economy (part (a)) and satisfies a condition 
which becomes increasingly restrictive as α becomes larger (part (b)).’  
2.  Define  PE(α)  as the set of interior Pareto efficient allocations for the α-economy.  It 
follows from condition (b) of theorem 3 that the Pareto sets are nested, that is: 
   α > ′α ⇒ PE(α)⊂ PE( ′α ) . 
Hence, denoting the fully altruistic economy by α = ∞ , we have: 
   PE(∞) =∩α≥0 PE(α) . 
 PE(∞)  will generally be a unique allocation – the allocation that maximizes social 
welfare. 
3.  Let α→∞ ; then condition (b) of theorem 3 reduces to: 
  .       (3.3) 
We have: 
Corollary 1  An interior allocation is efficient in the fully altruistic economy (i.e., 
maximizes social welfare)  if and only if: 







and   (c)  for some  > 0, u1[*, ]= u[*, ]
1 p . 
Proof: 






u[*, ]p 1 dF( )
. Then (3.3) can be written: 
  ∀γ u1[*,γ ]
−1 ≥ λu[*,γ ]p−1 . (3.4) 







u[*, ]p 1 dF( )
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Suppose there is a set of types of positive measure for which the inequality in (3.4) is 
slack.  Then integrating (3.4) gives us: 
        u1[*, ]
1 dF( ) > u[*, ]p 1 dF( ) ,  
which says > , a contradiction.  Therefore (3.4) holds with equality for almost all γ, 
and the corollary follows.  
 
4.  Consider the quasi-linear economy.  Then .  Now corollary 1 implies that in the 
quasi-linear economy, the only Pareto efficient interior allocation as α→∞  is the 
equal-utility allocation for which condition (a) holds.  
  Let us compute this allocation in the quasi – linear economy  in which production 
is linear: G(x) = x .   Then these conditions reduce to: 
  (i)   
 
2E( )
= 1 , and 
  (ii)  
 
k = x( ) E( )
2
, and 
  (iii)   x( )dF( ) = E( )dF( ) . 





, x( ) = +
4
, where  = dF( ).  
5. Consider the preferences when .  In this case, the altruistic part of U is 
, and .  Therefore condition (b) of theorem 2 becomes 
simpler: 
 







 We next prove: 
 
Theorem 4.  Let a sharing rule θ be given, and denote the set of β − Kantian equilibria 
for the economy  (u,G, F ,α)  by  K
β(θ,α) .  Then  K
β(θ,α) = Kβ(θ,0) . 
 u1 1
 p = 0
 




 Indeed, the theorem is more general than stated: different agents can have 
different values of the altruistic parameter α . The argument shows that the Kantian 
equilibria of these economies are identical to the Kantian equilibria of the associated 
economy where all  α 's  are zero.     This is apparently a disturbing result: for it says that 
Kantian optimization cannot deal, at least explicitly, with the externalities induced by 
altruism! 
 We do, however, have one instrument – namely, β -- which may help achieve 
Pareto efficient allocations when  α > 0 .   Indeed, consider the family of quasi-linear 
economies, where, for some fixed  ρ >1:  
 
 




For these economies we can always choose a value β  so that the  K β  equilibrium w.r.t. 
the allocation rule θβ  is efficient for economies with any value of α : that is to say, the 
 
(K β ,θβ )  allocation maximizes social welfare (and so is in  PE(∞) ). 
Theorem 5   Let 
 
uγ (x, E) = x − E
ρ
ργ
, some  ρ >1.  Let G be any concave production 
function. Define  E  by the equation  
E = γ ρ ′G (E)
1/(ρ−1)   where 
 
γ ρ ≡ γ
1/(ρ−1) dF(γ )∫ . Then 
for this economy : 
(a) An allocation is PE(0) iff  E(γ ) = γ
1/(ρ−1) ′G (E)1/(ρ−1) .   
(b)  Define 
 
β(ρ) = ρ G(E)
′G (E)
− E .   The  K β  allocation w.r.t. the sharing rule θβ   is in 
 PE(∞) . 
(c) As  β→β(ρ)  from below, the maximum value of α  for which the  
(K β ,θβ )  allocation 
is in  PE(α)  approaches infinity. 
 The reader is entitled to ask: What happens for  β > β(ρ) ?   The answer is that, in 
the 
 
(K β ,θβ )  allocation, some utilities become negative, and so social welfare for the CES 
family of functions is undefined, and so all-encompassing utility U is undefined. 
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B. Taxation in private-ownership economies 
 The  K β  equilibria for the sharing rules θβ  are not implementable with markets in 
any obvious way.   This is most easily seen by noting that the proportional rule is not so 
implementable10.   Of course, according the second theorem of welfare economics, there 
is some division of shares in the firm which operates G which would implement these 
rules in Walrasian equilibrium in continuum economies, but to compute those shares, one 
would have to know the preferences of the agents.    The advantage of the Kantian 
approach is that the Kantian allocations are decentralizable in the sense that agents need 
only know the production function G , average effort  E , and their own preferences,  to 
compute the deviation they would like (everybody) to make. 
 Nevertheless, one would like Kantian optimization to be useful in market 
economies as well.   For the linear economies, we have a hopeful result.  Before stating it, 
let us define the sharing rules associated with linear taxation.  Define the linear sharing 
rule for linear economies with production function  G(x) = ax  by: 
  
 





.    (3.6) 
That is, each agent receives  (1− t)  times the marginal product of his labor plus an equal 
share of tax revenues. 
 
Theorem 6 
A.  For any  t ∈[0,1] , the  K
+ equilibria for the linear tax rule  
θ[t ]  is Pareto efficient on  
 L0, fin . 
B.  The only allocation rules which are efficiently implementable in  K +  on  L0, fin  are of 
the form 
 




 for some  t ∈[0,1]  where: 
  (i) for all E,  k
j (E) = 0∑  
                                                
10 However, the equal-division sharing rule is market-implementable. Impose linear 
taxation in a Walrasian economy and set the tax rate equal to unity.  This is equivalent to 
the equal-division sharing rule. 
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  (ii) for all (j,E)  θ
j (E)∈[0,1] , and 
  (iii) for all (j,E),   ∇k
j (E) ⋅E = 0 . 
 
Proof: See appendix. 
 Part A of the theorem states that for finite economies with linear production, 
linear taxation provides a redistributive mechanism which is consistent with efficiency – 
for any tax rate in the [0,1] interval.     Therefore, in such an economy with a social ethos, 
citizens could choose a high tax rate to redistribute income substantially, without 
sacrificing allocative efficiency.  Part B of the theorem is analogous to part C of theorem 
1.     
  As in theorem 1, one is entitled to ask whether  there are examples of sharing 
rules where the functions  k j  are not identically zero.   There are, as the next example 
shows. 
 
Example 5.   










2(E1 − E2 )
2ES

















θ2(E) = 1− θ1(E)
,            (3.7) 
for  t ∈(0,1) .  It is easy to verify that these rules satisfy conditions B(i)-(iii), and these 
rules are clearly not linear tax rules.   
 We are not interested in linear economies as such, because they are so special.  
Theorem 6 is presented because it motivates us to ask how linear taxation performs in 
concave economies with a continuum of agents.  Let us postulate that a linear-taxation 
sharing rule is applied to a person’s income, which is equal to his effort times the 
Walrasian wage plus an equal-per-capita share of the firm’s profits.  The effort allocation 
 E(⋅)  is a  K






uγ ((1− t)(E(γ )+ r) ′G (E + r)+ (1− t)(G(E + r)− (E + r) ′G (E + r))+ tG(E + r), E(γ )+ r) = 0  
or:    u1
γ ⋅ (1− t)(E(γ )− E) ′′G (E)+ ′G (E)( ) + u2γ = 0 ,        (3.8) 







γ = ′G (E)+ (1− t)(E(γ )− E) ′′G (E) .        (3.9) 
What is noteworthy is that the wedge between the MRS and the MRT, which is 
 (1− t)(E(γ )− E) ′′G (E) ,   goes to zero as  t  approaches one.   Of course, this must be the 
case, since the allocation at  t = 1 is the kibbutz allocation, which we know is 0-efficient 
on concave economies.    (Of course, (3.9) gives the proof that the linear share rules are 
Pareto efficient on linear economies.) 
 Compare (3.9) with Nash-Walras equilibrium in the same private-ownership 







γ = (1− t) ′G (E) .     (3.10) 
Here, the wedge between the MRS and the MRT is  t ′G (E)  which becomes equal to the 
whole MRT as t goes to one.   If there is a social ethos, citizens might well wish to 
redistribute market incomes via taxation.  Under Nash optimization, it becomes 
increasingly costly to do so (as taxes increase), while with  K +  optimization, equation 
(3.9) suggests it may become decreasingly costly to do so. 





, for several 
values of  r ∈(0,1) ,  and use the quasi-linear utility 
 
uγ (x, y) = x − y
2
γ
.  The distribution F 
is lognormal with a mean of 50 and a median of 40.   Let the distribution of profit shares 
be egalitarian:  σ(γ ) ≡ 1.   (If we desire an anonymous Walrasian rule, we must choose 
this distribution.)  
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 I describe the computational procedure by which the  K +  equilibrium is computed 
for various tax rates.  The characterization of the effort schedule in  K +  equilibrium for 
the quasi-linear utility profile  is given by:  
   
(1− t) ′′G (E)(E(γ )− σ(γ )E)+ ′G (E) = 2
γ
E(γ )         (3.11)
  
  For the specified production function, this equation may be solved to yield:  
  
 
E( ,t) = E(t)
r 1 (1+ (1 r)(1 t))
2+ (1 r)(1 t)E(t)r 2
,   (3.12) 
where  E(t)  is the integral of  E( ,t)  dF.    Integrating (3.12) and manipulating the result 
gives an equation in the single unknown  E(t) : 
  
 
1= (1+ (1 r)(1 t))
2E(t)2 r + (1 r)(1 t)
dF( ) .  (3.13) 
Fixing r, we solve (3.13) for  E(t) numerically, for various values of t, and then compute 
the Kantian equilibrium effort schedule from (3.12).   Then we compute social welfare at 
the various values of t. 
 It is a standard exercise to compute the effort schedule for Walrasian equilibrium.  
Individual effort is given by 
 
E( ,t) = (1 t)w
2
, and average effort is given by 
 
E(t) = (1 t)w
2
, where w is the Walrasian wage, which solves to be:   
    
 







  .    
 We will perform a political-economy simulation.  For each voter, we may define 
an indirect (all-encompassing) utility function which gives her utility at the  K +  
equilibrium as a function of the tax rate, and another indirect utility function which gives 
her (all-encompassing) utility at the Nash-Walras equilibrium as a function of the tax 
rate.  These indirect utility functions are single-peaked in t, and so we will assume that 
the politically chosen tax rate is the ideal tax rate of the median-type voter.   (This will be 
the median ideal tax rate.)   We compute these tax rates for various values of the social-
ethos parameter α , for both  K +  and Nash-Walras equilibrium.  We compare social 
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welfare in these two equilibria, using the social-welfare function that citizens use in their 
all-encompassing utility functions. 
 Tables 1a and 1b report results for  r = 0.90 and r = 0.50 .   In the first case, the 
maximum admissible tax rate is about 0.70, because for higher rates, some utilities 
become negative, and the social-welfare function is undefined.  For each value of ! , I 
compute the ideal tax rate of the median type at the Kantian and Walrasian equilibrium, 
and report the values of social welfare at those political equilibria.   For  r = 0.5 , the 
maximum admissible tax rate is about 0.8.  In both cases, it turns out that the ideal tax 
rate of the median type, in the Kantian regime, is the maximum admissible rate.  We see 
from the tables that the ideal tax rate of the median type, in the Walrasian regime, is 









Table 1a  Political-equilibrium tax rates and social welfare in Kantian and Walrasian 
regimes, for  the quasi-linear economy with  G(x) = x





alpha t￿Kant t￿Walras Soc Wel ￿ Kant Soc Wel ￿ Walras
0. 0.7 0.166667 8.47076 7.72644
0.1 0.7 0.167536 8.47076 7.72656
0.2 0.7 0.168222 8.47076 7.72665
0.3 0.7 0.168778 8.47076 7.72672
0.4 0.7 0.169238 8.47076 7.72676
0.5 0.7 0.169624 8.47076 7.7268
0.6 0.7 0.169953 8.47076 7.72683
0.7 0.7 0.170237 8.47076 7.72686
0.8 0.7 0.170484 8.47076 7.72687
0.9 0.7 0.170701 8.47076 7.72689
1. 0.7 0.170894 8.47076 7.7269
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Table 1b Political-equilibrium tax rates and social welfare in Kantian and Walrasian 
regimes, for  the quasi-linear economy with  G(x) = x
0.5 / 0.5  and  ( ) 1  
 
This is a consequence of the deadweight loss experienced with taxation in the Walrasian 
regime.  We see that, even with substantial concavity, the political equilibrium in the 
Kantian regime dominates that of the Walrasian regime in terms of social welfare, at least 
for values of α  in  [0,1] .  
 
4. Existence and dynamics 
 The existence of proportional solutions, which are the  K ×  equilibria of convex 
economies  (u,G, F ,α)  was proved in Roemer and Silvestre (1993).   Here, we provide 
conditions under which β − Kantian equilibria exist, with respect to the sharing rules 
described in Theorem 1. 
 
Theorem 7.   .  Let  ξ ∈E
fin . Let the component functions of u be strictly concave. 




≤ 0 , then a strictly positive  K +  equilibrium w.r.t. the equal-
division sharing rule  θ
ED  exists on ξ . 
B. Let  0 ≤ β < ∞ .   If for all  u ∈u , u is quasi-linear, then a strictly positive β − Kantian 
equilibrium w.r.t. the sharing rule θβ  exists. 
Proof: Appendix. 
 The premises of this theorem can surely be weakened. 
 We turn briefly to dynamics.  There will not be robust dynamics for Kantian 
equilibrium, as there are not for Nash equilibrium.   There is, however, a simple dynamic 
mechanism that will, in well-behaved cases, converge to a Kantian equilibrium from any 
initial effort vector.   The mechanism is based on the mapping Θ  defined in the proof of 
theorem 7.   We illustrate it here for the case of a profile of quasi-linear utility functions 
and the equal-division sharing rule.  Thus,  let   u
j (x, y) = x − c j ( y) , for  j = 1,...,n , where 
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 c
j  is a strictly convex function.  For any vector  E0 ∈ ++
n , define  r















Define   Θ
j (E0 ) = E0
j + r j (E0 ) .  The mapping  Θ = (Θ
1,...,Θn ) maps  +
n → +
n  and is 
analogous to the best-reply correspondence in Nash equilibrium.   A fixed point of Θ  is a 
 K
+  equilibrium for the equal-division sharing rule, since at a fixed point  E* ,   r
j (E*) = 0  
for all j.  Since the example is special, the next result is proved only for the case n = 2, 
although it is true for finite n.  The next proposition shows that if we iterate the mapping 
Θ  indefinitely from any initial starting vector  E0  it converges to (the unique) K
+  
equilibrium for the equal-division sharing rule. 
 
Proposition 2   For n = 2, there exists a unique fixed point of the mapping Θ , which is a 
 K
+  equilibrium for the equal-division sharing rule with quasi-linear preferences.  The 
dynamic process defined by iterating the application of Θ  from any initial effort vector 
converges to the  K
+  equilibrium.  
Proof: Appendix.  
  
5. Discussion 
 My analysis has been positive rather than normative.   I have argued that if agents 
optimize in the Kantian way, then certain allocation rules will produce Pareto efficient 
allocations, while Nash optimization will not.  While the analysis is positive,  Kantian 
optimization,  if people follow it, is motivated by a moral point of view:  each must think 
that he should take an action if and only if he would advocate that all others take a similar 
action.     Is it plausible to think that there are (or could be) societies where individuals do 
(or would) optimize in the Kantian manner?   
 Certainly parents try to teach Kantian behavior to their children, at least in some 
contexts.   “Don’t throw that candy wrapper on the ground: How would you feel if 
everyone did so?”   The golden rule  (“Do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you” ) is a special case of Kantian ethics.   (And wishful thinking  [“if I do X, then all 
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those who are similarly situated to me will do X”], although a predictive claim, rather 
than an ethical one, will also induce Kantian equilibrium – if all think that way.)   This 
may explain why people vote in large elections, and make charitable contributions.    So 
there is some reason to believe that Kantian equilibria are accessible to human societies. 
 Consider the relationship between the theoretical concept of Nash equilibrium and 
the empirical evidence that agents play the Nash equilibrium in certain social situations 
that can be modeled as games.   We do not claim that agents are consciously computing 
the Nash equilibrium of the game: rather, we believe there is some process by which 
players discover the Nash equilibrium, and once it is discovered, it is stable, given 
autarkic reasoning.    We now know there are many experimental situations in which 
players in a game do not play (what we think is) the Nash equilibrium.  Conventionally, 
this ‘deviant’ behavior has been rationalized by proposing that players have different 
payoff functions from the ones that the experimenter is trying to induce in them, or that 
they are adopting behavior that is Nash in repeated games generated by the one-shot 
game under consideration.    Another possibility, however, is that players in these games 
are playing some kind of Kantian equilibrium.   In Roemer (2010), I showed that if, in the 
prisoners’ dilemma game, agents play mixed strategies on the two pure strategies of 
{cooperate, defect}, then all multiplicative Kantian equilibria entail both players’ 
cooperating with probability at least one-half   (i.e., no matter how great the payoff to 
defecting is).   It can also be shown that, in a stochastic dictator game, where the dictator 
is chosen randomly at stage 1 and allocates the pie between herself and the other player in 
stage 2,  the unique  K ×  equilibrium is that each player gives one-half the pie to the other 
player,  if he is chosen. 
 The non-experimental (i.e., real-world) counterpart, as I have said in the 
introduction, may be the games that the societies that Elinor Ostrom has studied are 
playing.   If these games can be modeled as ‘fisher’ economies, with common ownership 
of a resource whose use displays negative congestion externalities, and if, as Ostrom 
contends, these societies figure out how to engender efficient allocations of labor applied 
to the common resource, then they are discovering the multiplicative Kantian equilibrium 
of the game.  Perhaps Kantian reasoning helps to maintain the equilibrium, if optimizing 
behavior is ‘interdependent’ and not ‘autarkic.’  Ostrom  explains the maintenance of the 
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efficient labor allocation by the use of sanctions and punishments, but that may not be the 
entire story: it may be that most fishers are thinking in the Kantian manner, and that 
punishments and monitoring are needed only to control a minority who are Nash 
optimizers.   What I am proposing is that an ethic may have evolved, in these societies, in 
which the fisher says to himself,  “I would like to increase my fishing time by 5 hours a 
week, but I have a right to do so only if all others could similarly increase their fishing 
times, and that I would not like. ”       Armed only with the theory of Nash equilibrium, 
one naturally thinks that these Pareto efficient solutions to the tragedy of the commons 
require punishments to keep everyone in line.   But this may not be the case.  
 As I noted earlier, Kantian ethics, and therefore the behavior they induce, require 
less selflessness than another kind of ethic: putting oneself in the shoes of others.   
Consider charity.   “I should give to the unfortunate, because I could have been that 
unfortunate soul – indeed, there but for the grace of God go I. ”  The Kantian ethic says, 
“I will give to the unfortunate an amount which I would like all others who are similarly 
situated to me to give.”  Assuming that there is a social ethos (that is,  α > 0 ) this kind of 
reasoning may induce substantial charity – or, in the political case, fiscal redistribution.     
The Kantian ethic does not require the individual to place herself in the shoes of another.   
In this sense, it requires a less radical departure from self than the ‘grace of God’ 
reasoning does.   
 My analysis has studied the consequences of assuming that the optimizing 
behavior of individuals might not be autarkic, as in Nash equilibrium, but interdependent, 
as in the various kinds of Kantian optimization.    To the extent that human societies have 
prospered by invoking the ability of individuals of members of our species to cooperate 
with each other, it is perhaps likely that Kantian reasoning is a cultural adaptation, 
selected by evolution ( the classic reference is Boyd and Richerson [1985]).  Because we 
have shown that Kantian behavior can resolve, in many cases, the inefficiency of autarkic 
behavior, cultures which discover it, and attempt to induce that behavior in their 
members, will thrive relative to others.  Group selection may produce Kantian 
optimization as a meme. 
 One can rightfully ask whether it is utopian to suppose that the allocation rules 
studied here can be used in large economies.   I am skeptical, because the market 
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mechanism is so important in large economies, and most of the allocation rules described 
in theorem 1 cannot be decentralized using markets.   (I noted that the equal-division rule 
can be.)   This motivated my simulations of the linear-tax sharing rules where the market 
allocation is Walrasian.    We do not get full Pareto efficiency, but the results are much 
better when agents are Kantian  than when they are Nash optimizers.    
 One of the main motivations I gave for studying Kantian optimization was in 
order to resolve the inefficiencies in economies with a social ethos, due to the 
consumption externalities that they entail.   It seems that, if a society is solidaristic in the 
sense of possessing a social ethos, then its members should behave in a cooperative 
fashion.    The behavior upon which I have focused in this paper is optimizing behavior.    
I leave the reader with a question.  Is there reason to think that if a society is 
characterized by having a high degree of social ethos, it is more likely that its members 
can learn to optimize in the Kantian manner?    My intuition indicates this is probably so, 
but I cannot yet provide an argument to show it.   
March 1, 2012 
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(for “Kantian optimization, social ethos, and Pareto efficiency” by J.E. Roemer) 
“Appendix: Proofs of theorems” 
   
Proof of Theorem 1. 
The proof of part A simply mimics the proof of Proposition 1.  We prove part B. 
1.  Consider the Kantian variation  ϕ
β(x,r) = rE + (r −1)β , and any share rule 
 {θ
j , j = 1,...,n}, defined for a finite economy with n agents. 
The condition that must hold for a rule θ  to be efficiently implemented on  E  in  K
β  




j (E) ⋅(E +β)G(ES )+ θ j (E) ′G (ES )(ES + nβ)
E j +β
= ′G (ES ) , (A.1) 
which is the statement that that at a  K β  equilibrium  E = (E
1,..., En ) , the marginal rate of 
substitution between effort and income for each agent is equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation.  Recall that  E
S ≡ E j∑ ,  ∇θ j  is the gradient of the function  θ j  with 
respect to its n arguments,  E +β  is the vector whose jth component is  E
j +β , and 
 ∇θ










+ θ j (E) (E
S + nβ)
E j +β
= 1.  (A.2) 
2.  We now argue that (A.2) must hold as a set of partial differential equations on  ++
n .  
For let  E ∈ ++
n  be any vector.  Fix a production function G.  We can always construct n 
utility functions whose marginal rates of substitution at the points  (θ
j (E), E j )  are exactly 
given by the value of the left-hand side of equation (A.1).   For the economy thus defined, 
E is indeed a  K β  equilibrium.   This demonstrates the claim. 
3.  Continue to fix a vector  E ∈ ++






 for  i = 1,...,n  and notice that 
 
ϕβ(E j ,ri
j ) = Ei .  Consider the one dimensional manifold gotten by varying x:
 
M E
j = (ϕβ(x,r1),ϕβ(x,r2 ),...,ϕβ(x,rn )) .  Note that when  
x = E j ,  this picks out the vector 
E.    






ψ j (x) = θ j (ϕβ(x,r1
j ),...,ϕβ(x,rn
j )) .    Note that : 
 
 
(ψ j ′) (x) = ∇θ j (ϕβ(x,r
j )) ⋅r j  (A.3) 
where  
ϕβ(x,r)  is the generic vector in the manifold, and  r
j = (r1
j ,...,rn
j ) . 
Define  μ
j (x) = G( ϕ(x,ri
j ))∑  and note that: 
  (μ
j ′) (x) = ′G ( ϕ(x,ri
j )) ri
j∑∑ . (A.4) 
It follows that we may write (A.2) restricted to the manifold  M E
j  as: 
 
 
(ψ j ′) (x)r S , j μ
j (x)
(μ j ′) (x)
+μ j (x)r S , j = 1 , (A.5) 
where 
 
r S , j ≡ ri
j
i
∑ .  
4.   (A.5) is a first-order ODE.    A particular solution is given by the constant function: 
 
 
ψ j (x) = 1
r S , j
, (A.6) 
and the general solution to its homogeneous variant is: 
 
 
ψ̂ j (x) = k
j (r j )
μ j (x)
, (A.7) 
where  k j  a constant that depends on  r j  (i.e., on the manifold  M E
j ).  Therefore the 
general solution of  (A.5) is  
   
 
ψ j (x) = 1
r S , j
+ k
j (r j )
μ j (x)
.        (A.8) 
Now, evaluating this equation at  x = E j  gives: 
 
 
ψ j (E j ) = θ j (E) = 1
r S , j
+ k






j (r j )
G(E)
. (A.9) 
Since the n shares in (A.8) sum to one, (A.8) tells us that we must have  k
j (r j ) = 0∑ .  
This proves part C.     
5.  To prove part B,  return to equation (A.8) which holds on the manifold  M E
j .   For 
 β = 0  (i.e.,  K
×  equilibrium), the manifold  M E
j ={(r1
j x,...,rn
jx) | x ≥ 0} .  Hence, as x 
approaches zero  μ
j (x)  approaches zero.  If, for some j,  k
j (r j ) ≠ 0 , then for sufficiently 
small x,  ψ
j (x)  would violate the constraint that it lie in  [0,1] .  Hence, for the case when 
 3 
 β = 0  (and only for that case) we may conclude that the constants  k
j  are identically zero, 
and the claim of part B follows.   
 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
1.  An interior allocation E is Nash implementable on the class of finite convex 







G(ES )+ θ j (E) ′G (ES ))+ u2
j = 0  (A.10) 
Therefore θ  is efficiently implementable iff: 
 
 






2.  Indeed, (A.11) must hold for the entire positive orthant  ++
n , for given any positive 
vector E,  we can construct n concave utility functions such that (A.10) holds at E. 
 
3.  For fixed E, define 
 
ψ j (x) = θ j (E1, E2 ,..., E j−1,x, E j+1,..., En )  and 
 




1= ψ j (x)+ μ
j (x)
(μ j ′) (x)
(ψ j ′) (x) , (A.12) 
which must hold on  ++ . 
4.  But (A.12) implies that  
 
 
(ψ j ′) (x)





which implies that  μ
j (x)(1− ψ j (x)) = k j  and therefore 
 
ψ j (x) = 1− k
j (E− j )
μ j (x)
 where 
the constant  k j  may depend on the manifold  (E
1,.., E j−1,x, E j+1,.., En )  on which  ψ
j  is 
defined. 
.   
5.  In turn, this last equation says that on the unidimensional space 
 
(E1,..., E j−1,x, E j+1,..., En )  we have: 
 
 
θ j (E1,..., E j−1,x, E j+1,..., En )G(x + E
S − E j ) = G(x + E
S − E j )− k
j (E− j ) , (A.14) 





(∀x, y > 0)
(θ j (E1,..., E j−1,x, E j+1,..., En )G(x + E
S − E j )− θ
j (E1,..., E j−1, y, E j+1,..., En )G( y + E
S − E j ) =
G(x + ES − E j )−G( y + E
S − E j ))
 
           (A.15) 
Now let  
y = 0 and x = E j  and let  
z j = G(E
S − E j ) ,   Then (A.15) says that: 
 
 
(∀j)(θ j (E)G(E)− z j = G(E)−G(E − E j )) . (A.16) 
6.  Adding up the equations in (A.16) over j, and using the fact that  
z j ≥ 0 , we have: 
  






G(E − E j )∑ . (A.18) 
 




(ES − E j ) = E





(ES − E j )) ≤
1
n−1
G(ES − E j )∑∑ , (A.19) 
which is impossible for any strictly concave G.   This proves part A of the theorem. 
8.  The proof of part B is familiar: for part B just says that Nash behavior, taking prices as 




Proof of Theorem 3: 









∀γ uγ (x*(γ )+ h(γ ), E*(γ )+ q(γ ))+αK ≥ uγ (x*(γ ), E*(γ ))+αK *
∀γ x*(γ )+ h(γ ) ≥ 0
∀γ E*(γ )+ q(γ ) ≥ 0
K ≤ uγ (x*(γ )+ h(γ ), E*(γ )+ q(γ )) p dF(γ )∫( )1/ p




where D  is any set of types of positive measure.  Suppose the solution to this program is 
 . (K* is the value of the social-welfare function – given in the K 
constraint in the program -- when  h = q = 0 .) Then  (x
*(⋅), E*(⋅))  is a Pareto efficient  
allocation.  Since we are studying strictly positive allocations, the second and third sets of 
constraints at the proposed optimal solution will be slack. 
 We will show that conditions (a) and (b) of the proposition characterize the * 
allocations for which this statement is true.  Let  be any feasible triple in the 
above program, for a fixed positive allocation  (x
*, E*) .  Let .   Then define 
the Lagrange function: 
 
 
Δ(ε) = uτ(x*(τ)+ εh(τ), E*(τ)+ εq(τ)
τ∈D
∫ )dF(τ)+αF(D)(K * + εΔK )+





λ K * + εΔK )( ) + B(γ )∫ (u(x*(τ)+ εh(τ), E*(τ)+ εq(τ),τ)+αεΔK − u(x*(τ), E*(τ),τ))dF(τ).
 
 
Suppose there is non-negative function  B( )  and non-negative numbers  for which 
the function  is maximized at zero.   Note  is the value of the objective of the 
above program, when  and , and  equals the value of the 
objective at  plus some non-negative terms.  The claim will then follow.   Since 
 is a concave function, it suffices to produce an allocation  (x
*, E*)  for which non-
negative  exist such that . 
 Compute the derivative of  at zero: 
 
 h
* 0, q* 0, K = K *
 (h,q, K )
 K = K K *
 ( , )
 (0)
 h
* 0 q*  K = K *  (1)
 (h,q, K )
 (B, , )  (0) = 0
 6 
 
′Δ (0) = u1[*,γ ]h(γ )+ u2[*,γ ]q(γ )dF(γ )( )
D
∫ +αF(D)ΔK +
ρ ′G ( E*(τ)dF(τ)) q(τ)dF(τ)− h(τ)dF(τ)∫∫∫( ) +
λ
p
(Q*)(1− p)/ p p u[*,γ ]p−1∫ u1[*,γ ]h(γ )+ u2[*,γ ]q(γ )( )dF(γ )−
λΔK + B(γ )∫ u1[*,γ ]h(γ )+ u2[*,γ ]q(γ )+αΔK( )dF(γ ).
 
 
We now gather together the coefficients of  K ,h,  and q in the above expression 
and set them equal to zero: 
 
Coefficient of   ΔK :     αF(D)+α B(γ )dF(γ )− λ = 0∫   (A.9) 
 
Coefficient of  h( ) : u1[*, ]1D + (Q
*)(1 p)/ p u[*, ]p 1u1[*, ]+ B( )u1[*, ]= 0 ,   
(A.10) 
Coefficient of  q( ) : u2[*, ]1D + G (E)+ (Q
*)(1 p)/ p u[*, ]p 1u2[*, ]+ B( )u2[*, ] = 0 ,  
(A.11) 
where  and  E = E
*( )dF( ) . 
 By setting all these coefficients equal to zero, and solving for the Lagrange 
multipliers, we will discover the characterization of the allocation .  Note that, 
at an interior Pareto efficient solution, we must have: 




= G (E) , 
for this is the statement that the marginal rate of substitution for each type between labor 




u1[*, ]+ u2[*, ]= u1[*, ] 1+
u2[*, ]
u1[*, ]
= u1[*, ] 1 G (E)( ) .  (A.12) 
 
1D ( ) =
1,  if D




Now add together the equations for the coefficients of  q( ) and h( ) , divide this new 
equation by  1 G (E) , use equation (A.12), and the result is exactly the equation (A.11). 
Therefore, eqn. (A.12) has enabled us to eliminate equation (A.11): if we can produce 
non-negative values  (B( ), , )  satisfying (A.9) and (A.10), we are done. 




u1[*, ]1D u1[*, ] (Q
*)(1 p)/ p u[*, ]p 1
u1[*, ]
 .    (A.13) 
From eqn. (A.9), we have  λ = αF(D)+α B(γ )dF(γ )∫ , and substituting the expression 






1+α(Q*)(1− p)/ p u[*,γ ]p−1 dF(γ )∫
   (A.14). 
 
Eqn. (A.13) says that  B( )  is non-negative if and only if  
   u1[*, ](1D + (Q
*)(1 p)/ p u[*, ]p 1)  ;                (A.15) 
substituting the expression for λ from (A.14) into (A.15) yields an inequality in ρ which, 
by rearranging terms, can be written as: 
 
 
ρ 1− u1[*,γ ]
α(Q*)(1− p)/ p u[*,γ ]p−1 u1[*,τ]
−1 dF(τ)∫





≥ u1[*,γ ] .        (A.16) 
In sum, we can find non-negative Lagrange multipliers iff we can produce a non-negative 






α(Q*)(1− p)/ p u[*,γ ]p−1 u1[*,τ]
−1 dF(τ)∫
1+α(Q*)(1− p)/ p u[*,τ]p−1 dF(τ)∫
, 
proving the theorem.     
 
Proof of Theorem 4. 
 We prove the generalization of the theorem stated in the text.  We prove the result 
for  K ×  equilibrium for simplicity’s sake, although the proof for  K β  equilibrium is the 
same.  Also for simplicity’s sake, we use the social-welfare function of (1.1). 
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γ (θγ (rE)G(rE),rE(γ ))+αγ exp log(uτ(θτ(rE)G(rE),rE(τ))dF(τ)∫( ) = 0 , (A.17) 
where we assume that the altruism parameters  {α
γ}  are non-negative.  Expand this 
derivative, writing it as:  
 
 















2.  Now (A.18) says that : 
  (∀γ )(D
γ (E) = −αγk)  
where k is a constant (independent of γ ).   Therefore we can substitute  −α
τk  for  D
τ(E)  
on the r.h.s. of eqn. (A.18), and re-write that equation as: 
  −α
γk −αγkm = 0 ,      (A. 19) 
where m is a positive constant.   If  α
γ = 0 ,  we have from  (A.18) that  D
γ (E) = 0 . Id 
 α
γ ≠ 0 ,   it follows from (A.19)   that  k = 0 .   But this means that for all γ ,  D
γ (E) = 0 , 
which is exactly the condition that E is a Kantian equilibrium for the economy with 
 α = 0 .  
 
Proof of Theorem 5: 
 
1.  The effort allocation in part (a) maximizes the surplus, which is the condition for 
efficiency in the quasi-linear economy with  α = 0 . 
2. Integrating the expression for  E(γ ) , we have that the equation 
 
E = γ ρ ′G (E)
1/(ρ−1)  ,characterizing  E .  
3.  To prove claim (b), we show that the  β(ρ) -Kantian 
 equilibrium produces equal utilities across γ . From Remark 4 stated after Theorem 2, 



























where k is a constant independent of γ .   Calculation shows that the value of β  that 
causes the coefficient of  γ
1/(ρ−1)  in (A.17) to vanish is  β(ρ)  as defined in claim (b).  It is 
easy to observe that  β(ρ) > 0  by the concavity of G, and because  ρ >1.  This proves 
claim (b). 
4.  Claim (c) follows from analyzing the condition (b) of theorem 2, which for quasi-
linear economies is: 
    (∀γ ) 1+α u[*,τ]
−1 dF(∫ τ) ≥ αu[*,γ ]−1 , 
 
 as β  approaches  β(ρ)  from below.   
 
Proof of Theorem 6: 
1.   A simple calculation shows that if  E  is a  K +  equilibrium for an economy with a 
linear production function  G(x) = ax  w.r.t. any linear tax sharing rule  
θ[t ] , for  t ∈[0,1] , 
then the  allocation is 0-Pareto efficient.   
2.  Now let  E  be a  K +  equilibrium w.r.t. any sharing rule θ  on  (u,G, F ,0)  which is 




j (∇θ j (E) ⋅1)aES + θ j (E)an( ) + u2j = 0 , 
and so Pareto efficiency means that: 
  
 
(∇θ j (E) ⋅1)aES + θ j (E)an( ) = a , 
or: 
   (∇θ
j (E) ⋅1)ES + nθ j (E) = 1.     (A.18) 
As has been argued in previous proofs,  (A.18) must hold as a system of partial 
differential equations on  ++
n .   
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3. Define  ri
j = Ei − E j .  Define  ψ
j (x) = θ j (x + r1
j ,...,x + rn
j ) .  Note that 
 (ψ
j ′) (E j ) = (∇θ j (E) ⋅1) .  Hence, on the manifold  M E
j ={(x + r1
j ,...,x + rn
j )}, we may 
write the differential equation (A.18) as: 
    (ψ
j ′) (x)(nx + r j ,S )+ nψ j (x) = 1,   (A.19) 
where 
 
r j ,S = ri
j
i
∑ .   Since the linear tax rules satisfy (A.18) by step 1, it follows that a 
particular solution of (A.19) is 
 
ψ j (x) = (1− t) x
nx + r j ,S
+ t
n
, for any  t ∈[0,1] .   The 
general solution to the homogeneous variant of (A.19) is 
 
ψ j (x) = k
j
nx + r j ,S
,  where  k j  is 
a constant that may depend upon the manifold  M E
j .   Therefore the general solution to 
(A.19) is: 
   
 
ψ j (x) = (1− t) x





nx + r j ,S
, 
where t may be chosen freely, and  k j  is as described.  Translating back, this means that 
  
 





where we must have: 
 (i) for all E,  k
j (E) = 0∑  
 (ii)  θ
j (E)∈[0,1]  
 (iii) for all j and E,  ∇k
j (E) ⋅1 = 0 . 
Statements (i) and (ii) are obvious requirements, while statement (iii) says that the 
functions  k j  are constant on the manifolds  M E
j .    
 
Proof of Theorem 7: 
Part A 
1.  Define the functions: 
 
 
r j (K , y) = max
r
u j (G(K + y + nr)
n
, y + r)  for  (K , y)∈ +
2 . 
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These are single-valued functions, by strict concavity of u. 
 
The first-order condition defining rj  is: 
   u1
j (⋅) ′G (K + y + nr)+ u2
j (⋅) = 0 . 
 
2.  Using the implicit function theorem,  compute that the derivatives of  r j  w.r.t. its 







j ′′G + u11
j ′G 2 + u12
j ′G
n(u1
j ′′G + u11






The denominator of this fraction is negative by concavity of u and G, the the numerator is 
negative since  u12
















j + ( ′G )2u11
j + 2 ′G u12
j + u1
j ′′G )





< 0 .  
3. Define  y
j  by r j (0, y j ) = 0 .   If all agents other than j are putting in zero effort, then  y
j  
is the amount of effort for j at which he would not like to increase all efforts by any 
number.  Now define 
 
K − j = y j
i≠ j
∑ .   Next define  z
j  by   r
j (K − j , z j ) = 0 .    z j  is the 
amount of effort for j such that, if all other agents i are expending  y
i and he is expending 
 z
j ,  he would not like to add or subtract any amount from all efforts. 
4.   We argue that  z
j < y j  for all j.   Just note that  r
j (K − j , z j ) = 0 = r j (0, y j ) .   Since 
 K − j > 0 , it follows that  z
j < y j , because the  r j are decreasing functions. 
5.  Hence we may define the non-degenerate rectangle  Δ ={E ∈ ++
n | z ≤ E ≤ y} . 
6.   By applying the definition of  r
j (K , y) , note that we have the identity: 
   r
j (K + (n−1)b,a + b) = r j (K ,a)− b . 
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7.  We now define a function  Θ : +
n → +
n : 
   Θ(E
1,..., En ) = (E1 + r1( Ê−1, E1),..., En + r n( Ê−n , En ))  
where 
 
Ê− j ≡ Ei
i≠ j
∑ .   Θ  is like the best-reply correspondence in Nash equilibrium. 
Θ  is single-valued and continuous, by the Berge maximum theorem.   
   We next show that  Θ(Δ)⊆ Δ .   Let  E = (E
1,..., En )∈Δ .   We must show: 
    (∀j)(z
j ≤ E j + r j ( Ê− j , E j ) ≤ y j .   (A.20) 
By step 6,   we have  
    r
j ( Ê− j , E j )− ( y j − E j ) = r j ( Ê− j + (n−1)( y j − E j ), y j ) ≤ 0 , 
where the inequality follows because  r j  is decreasing and  r
j (0, y j ) = 0  and 
 Ê
− j + (n−1)( y j − E j ) ≥ 0 .   This proves the second inequality in (A. 20).  
 Again by step 6, we have: 
  r
j ( Ê− j , E j )− (z j − E j ) = r j ( Ê− j + (n−1)(z j − E j ),z j ) ≥ 0  
where the inequality follows because  r j  is decreasing and  Ê
− j + (n−1)(z j − E j ) ≤ K − j  
(note that  (n−1)(z
j − E j ) ≤ 0 ).   This proves the first inequality in (A.20). 
8.  Hence, the function Θ  satisfies all the premises of Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, 
and hence possesses a fixed point. But a fixed point of Θ  is a vector E such that for all j, 
 r
j ( Ê− j , E j ) = 0 , which is precisely a  K +  equilibrium.  (Note that the rectangle is in the 
strictly positive orthant, which implies that the equilibrium is strictly positive.) 
 Part B 
9.  The proof proceeds in the same fashion as above, except we now define the functions: 
         
 
rβ
j (K , y) = argmax
r
u j ( ry +β(r −1)+β
r(K + y)+ nβ(r −1)+ nβ
G(r(K + y)+ n(r −1)β,ry +β(r −1)) . 
Recall that y will be evaluated at  E j  and K  at   Ê− j  for a vector E. 
The first-order condition defining the functions 
 
rβ
j  is: 
     u1
j ⋅ ′G + u2
j = 0 , 
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where u is evaluated at the point 
 
( y +β
K + y + nβ
G(r(K + y)+ (r −1)nβ),ry + (r −1)β) .  We 









j ) y +β
K + y + nβ
′G rβ
j − G








( y +β)( ′G 2u11
j + 2 ′G u12
j + u22
j )+ u1
j ′′G (K + y + nβ)
. 
The denominator is negative by the concavity of u and G.   Quasi-linearity implies that 
 ′G u11
j + u12
j = 0  and so the numerator is negative if  
rβ
j > 0 .   But note that we must have 
 ry + (r −1)β ≥ 0 , since efforts cannot be negative, and so r is restricted to the interval 




> 0 , and so 
 
rβ





< 0 .  








j ′G 2 ( y +β)
K + y + nβ
+ ′G G (K + (n−1)β)







j ′G K + 2y + (n+1)β





+ K + y + (n−1)β








( y +β)( ′G 2u11
j + 2 ′G u12
j + u22
j + u1 ′′G (K + y + nβ)
 
The denominator is negative by concavity, and the numerator is negative since  u12






< 0 . 
10.  Hence the functions 
 
rβ
j  are decreasing, and the proof proceeds as before, from steps 
3 through 8.          
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
The proof proceeds by showing that the mapping Θ  is a contraction mapping.  It uses the 
following well-known result: 
Lemma  Let  be a norm on  n  and let  A  be the associated sup norm on mappings 
 A :




A(x) .   Let  J ( A)  be the Jacobian matrix of A. If 
 J ( A) <1 , then A is a contraction mapping. 
 14 
 If we can show that Θ  is a contraction mapping, then it possesses a unique fixed 
point, and the dynamic process induced by iterating the application of Θ  from any initial 
effort vector will converge to the fixed point. 
 



















j (E1, E2 ) = ∂r
j
∂Ei
(E1, E2 ) , assuming that these derivatives exist.  Thus, the lemma 
requires that we show the norm of this matrix is less than unity.   We take  to be the 

























⎟ <1 .   (A.21) 
2.  Assuming differentiability of  c j , the function  r
j (E)  is defined by the following first-
order condition: 
  ′G (E
S + 2r j (E)) = (c j ′) (E j + r j (E)) ,      (A.22) 
which has a unique solution under standard assumptions.  By the implicit function 
theorem, the derivatives of  r
j (⋅)  are given by: 
 
  ′′G ( y
j )(1+ 2ri
j (E)) = (c j ′′) (x j )(δ i
j + ri
j (E)) , 
where  y




1,  if i = j











j (c j ′′) (x j )− ′′G ( y j )
2 ′′G ( y j )− (c j ′′) (x j )
.    (A.23) 





2 ′′G ( y1)− (c1 ′′) (x1)
− ′′G ( y1)
2 ′′G ( y1)− (c1 ′′) (x1)
− ′′G ( y2 )
2 ′′G ( y2 )− (c2 ′′) (x2 )
′′G ( y2 )
















and so, from step 1, we need only show that: 
   (Q
1(E1 − E2 ))2 + (Q2(E1 − E2 ))2 <1    (A. 24) 
where 
 
(E1, E2 ) = 1 and 
 
Q j = ′′G ( y
j )
2 ′′G ( y j )− (c j ′′) (x j )
.     Note that 
 
Q j < 1
2
.  Therefore 




(1− E1E2 ) <1, which is obviously true, proving the 
proposition.    
 
 





   
   
   
 
 
 
